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I.  INTRODUCTION	  
Title VII is a landmark piece of legislation that has substantially leveled 
the playing field for traditionally underrepresented minorities in the workplace.1  
While the greatest beneficiaries of Title VII have been women, many scholars 
have opined that Title VII was not originally intended to provide such protection.2  
The majority of scholars agree that Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia, 
Chairman of the Rules Committee at the time the bill was being debated, added 	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1 See generally Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2011). 
2 Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 
9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 164 (1991) (quoting “The popular interpretation of the addition of “sex” to 
Title VII is that “it was the result of a deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it”) (citing 
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985)). 
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“sex” to the bill as a means to defeat its passage in the House.  Congressman 
Smith’s proposal “stimulated several hours of humorous debate, later enshrined as 
‘Ladies Day in the House,’ before the amendment was passed.”3  While arguably 
women have been the greatest beneficiaries of Title VII,4 they have also 
experienced some of the greatest difficulty in establishing viable claims of 
discrimination due to the confusion associated with the “because of sex” 
language.5  Because of the rushed nature of its inclusion, the precise interpretation 
of the “because of sex” language has left many scholars and judges in 
disagreement regarding its intended application.6 This confusion has caused a 
greater level of disarray in the context of sex discrimination claims in hostile 
work environments, particularly those cases in which the harassing employee 
equally harasses both men and women in the workplace.  In this scenario, it is 
often more difficult for a female plaintiff-employee to establish the “but for” 
causation due to the causal nexus between the harassment and the harasser’s 
motivation for such harassment becomes attenuated.7  This reduction in causation 
often allows sexual harassers to take advantage of what has become known as the 
equal opportunity harasser defense.8 
The following example illustrates a typical case involving the equal 
opportunity harasser.   Lawrence, a supervisor for ABC, Inc., is extremely rude 
and brash towards his subordinate employees.  On numerous occasions, he has 
directed the use of the word “bitch” and other demeaning and derogatory 
comments towards both male and female employees.  Emma Louise, one of 
Lawrence’s subordinate employees, becomes irritated with Lawrence’s antics and 
decides to report his conduct to the human resources manager.  The human 
resources manager did nothing with the information, prompting Emma Louise to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Id. 
4 Pamela J. Smith, Part I - Romantic Paternalism - The Ties That Bind Also Free: Revealing the 
Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 107 (noting that white 
women, in particular, have been the greatest economic beneficiaries of Title VII).   
5 See infra Part IV. 6 See infra note 86.  
7 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.  
8 See infra Part III. 
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bring an action under Title VII for sex discrimination.  While Lawrence’s conduct 
was clearly reprehensible, in jurisdictions that recognize the equal opportunity 
harasser defense, Emma Louise would have difficulty establishing a hostile work 
environment claim, because Lawrence’s conduct was directed equally at both men 
and women. 
Under the current framework for analyzing equal opportunity harassment 
cases, the primary burden is on the female plaintiff to establish that she was 
harassed because of her sex as part of her prima facie case.9  This is a difficult 
burden to establish when the harasser directs the same conduct at both men and 
women because such behavior weakens the nexus between the harassing conduct 
and the motivation behind it.10  Instead, the equal opportunity harasser defense 
should be treated as an affirmative defense, requiring the employer to carry both 
the burdens of production and persuasion. Thus, the employer would have to 
establish that the equality of the supervisor’s harassment entitles the employer to a 
favorable judgment.  Simultaneously, the plaintiff’s burden should be 
substantially lessened to require that she merely produce sufficient facts to show 
that it is plausible that she was harassed “because of sex,” rather than requiring 
her to persuade the trier of fact that she actually was harassed “because of sex.”11 
This shift in burdens is also bolstered by the Court’s recent decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal, in which both cases established higher pleading requirements 
for plaintiffs in civil rights cases.12  As such, a new framework for analyzing this 
special type of hostile work environment claim is needed to protect victimized 
employees who have been treated unjustly and in violation of the spirit of Title 
VII. 
Furthermore, there should be a category of conduct that presumptively 
establishes a plausible claim of hostile work environment based on sex, regardless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
10 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
11 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
12 This shift in burdens is necessitated by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Iqbal and 
Twombly, which have established higher pleading requirements for plaintiffs in civil rights cases. 
See infra Section V; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 548 U.S. 
903 (2006).  
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of whether the conduct is equally directed at persons of the opposite sex.  This 
argument is not without precedent.  For example, if a black employee alleged that 
he was subject to a racially hostile work environment because a white co-
employee called him a “nigger,” it would be untenable for an employer to defend 
such conduct by asserting that the harassing employee also directed the 
aforementioned slur at other white employees.13  In essence, in the context of 
hostile work environment claims based on race, there are certain actions that 
“speak for themselves.” Courts should be willing to extend this same idea to 
hostile work environment claims based on sex.	  
This Article will establish a new framework for analyzing hostile work 
environment cases.  To further facilitate a discussion of my argument, Section II 
of this Article will provide a comprehensive background and historical context of 
the hostile work environment claim.  Section III will chronicle the development of 
the equal opportunity harasser defense.  Section IV will analyze the various 
approaches that other scholars have advanced for dealing with the equal 
opportunity harasser defense.  Finally, Section V will define my resolution to this 
problem and explain how it will strike a more fair balance for both employers and 
employees in the context of the equal opportunity harasser defense.  In addition, 
this section of the paper will also explain why my position is strongly supported 
by other similarly related legal precedent, as well as how Twombly and Iqbal have 
operated to close access to the protections of Title VII. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOSTILE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT CLAIM 
The first case to recognize claims involving a hostile work environment 
was Rogers v. EEOC.14  In Rogers, an employee alleged that she was 
discriminated against based upon her status as a Spanish surnamed employee 
because she: (1) was terminated from her job without any reason other than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting “The same is true of 
racial harassment, for example. If an African American is repeatedly subjected to racial slurs and 
talk of lynching by his co-workers, we typically do not ask, ‘But was he singled out because of his 
race?’”) (citing Daniels v. Essex Grp. Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991)); Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.1986)).  
14 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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fact that there was some “friction” in the workplace, in spite of the fact that her 
work was “alright”; (2) was abused by her female Caucasian co-employees; and 
(3) was segregated from some of the patients.15  The district court held that while 
the employer’s discrimination against its Spanish surnamed employees may have 
been offensive to the plaintiff-employee, she nonetheless failed to establish that 
she was discriminated against. Specifically, the court found that she had not been 
“aggrieved” by an unlawful employment practice, as defined by Title VII, since 
the harassment was directed at the patients of the employer and not the 
employees.16   The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
and held that an: 
[E]mployees’ psychological as well as economic fringes are 
statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and that the 
phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” in Section 
703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective 
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily 
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.17 
The court further provided that not all, offensive conduct will rise to the 
level of creating a hostile work environment.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. at 244.  With respect to the third allegation, regarding patient segregation, the employer 
argued that it was not liable for an unlawful employment practice because segregation of patients, 
if true, was not an act directed at the plaintiff-employee. Id. 
16 The Act states that:  
(a) Employer practices [:] It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2011) 
17 Rogers, 454 F.2d. at 238. 
18 Id. 
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[A]n employer’s mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which 
engenders offensive feelings in an employee falls within the 
proscription of Section 703. But by the same token I am simply not 
willing to hold that a discriminatory atmosphere could under no set 
of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employment practice. 
One can readily envision working environments so heavily 
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the 
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers, 
and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of 
such noxious practices.19 
Approximately fifteen years after Rogers, the Supreme Court, in Meritor, 
expanded the theory of hostile work environment to apply in sexual harassment 
cases.20  In Meritor, a bank employee sued her employer after she was terminated 
for allegedly abusing her sick leave.21  The employee claimed that shortly after 
she began employment she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, the bank’s 
vice president.22  She stated that the vice president “invited her out to dinner and, 
during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a motel to have sexual 
relations.”23  She indicated that she rebuffed his advances, but ultimately 
acquiesced because she feared she would lose her job if she did not comply.24  
The employee further testified that after she gave into the vice president’s sexual 
advances, he continued to make “repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, 
usually at the branch, both during and after business hours; she estimated that 
over the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times.”25  
She also indicated that he “fondled her in front of other employees, followed her 
into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id. 
20 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57. 
21 Id. at 59. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 60. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
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and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”26  The employer denied that 
the vice president harassed the employee and further advanced that any 
harassment “was unknown to the bank and engaged in without its consent or 
approval.”27  The district court denied the employee’s claim and held that if there 
was in fact a relationship between the employee and the vice president, such 
relationship was voluntary and had nothing to do with her continued 
employment.28 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision 
because it failed to consider a claim of sexual harassment based on a “hostile 
work environment.”29  The court of appeals clarified that sexual harassment 
claims may be based on either “harassment that involves the conditioning of 
concrete employment benefits on sexual favors,30 or harassment that, while not 
affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive working 
environment.”31 The court of appeals further opined that it was unclear what the 
district court meant when it held that the relationship between the employee and 
the vice president voluntary.32  According to the court, if the vice president made 
“toleration of sexual harassment [as] a condition of her employment,” whether she 
voluntarily complied with such harassment was immaterial.33  Finally, the court of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 61. 
28 Id. In light of the fact that the district court determined that no sexual harassment occurred, it 
went on to hold that the employer had no knowledge of the alleged harassment and therefore could 
not be held liable for any harassment by the supervisor.  Id. at 62. 
29 Id. at 62.  
30 This practice is commonly referred to as “quid pro quo” which is the Latin term meaning 
“something for something.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (9th ed. 2009).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary further defines quid pro quo sexual harassment as “sexual harassment in which an 
employment decision is based on the satisfaction of a sexual demand.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009). 
31 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62. 
32 Id. at 62. 
33 Id.  
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appeals held that the employer was strictly liable for supervisor harassment 
regardless of whether it knew or should have known of the harassment.34 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the employer argued that Title VII sexual 
harassment claims can only arise where such harassment results in an economic or 
tangible loss such as a demotion, termination or reduction in pay.35  The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument on two grounds.36  First, it held that “the language of 
Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”37  “The phrase 
‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in 
employment.”38 Second, the Court held that “the EEOC Guidelines fully support 
the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII.”39  
The Court agreed with the court of appeals’ determination that “the correct 
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual 
advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual 
intercourse was voluntary.”40  However, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ 
decision regarding employer liability.41  As noted above, the court of appeals 
determined that an employer is strictly liable for supervisor harassment.  While 
the Court reversed this holding, it did not adopt the employer’s position that a 
defendant-employer can never assume liability where it has a policy against 
harassment and a plaintiff-employee fails to take advantage of such policy.  
Instead, the Court remanded the case and instructed the district court to determine 
the employer’s liability by considering agency principles; however, the Court did 
not provide any guidance as to how to apply those principles.42  Despite its failure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. at 69-70. 
35 Id. at 64. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38Id. (citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting 
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
39 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
40 Id. at 68. 
41 Id. at 72. 
42 Id. at 73. The Court stated:  
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to adequately address the employer liability issue, the Court held that a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment, based on hostile work environment, could be 
established if an employee could prove each of the following: 
(A) That she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; 
(B) That the harassment was based on sex; 
(C) That the sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably 
interfering with the plaintiff's work performance in creating an 
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that 
affected seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff 
(The third prong of the prima facie case requires both a subjective 
and objective inquiry, compelling the court to ask whether a 
reasonable person would find the environment hostile.); and 
(D) That there is a basis for imputing liability to the 
employer.43 
Notwithstanding this clarity on the prima facie requirements, the Supreme 
Court’s failure to adequately determine when an employer could be held liable for 
a supervisor’s harassment caused a circuit split to emerge. Before the Court could 
resolve this issue, however, it first expounded upon Meritor’s prima facie 
requirements by determining whether it was necessary for an employee in a 
hostile work environment claim to prove that she suffered psychologically.”44  In 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the plaintiff-employee alleged that she was 
harassed in violation of Title VII after the president of the company, on multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
We therefore decline the parties’ invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer 
liability, but we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to 
agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles 
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to 
define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer surely evinces an intent 
to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title 
VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual 
harassment by their supervisors.  For the same reason, absence of notice to an 
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability. (internal 
citations omitted).   
43 Id. at 66-67. 
44 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 519 U.S. 17 (1993). 
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occasions, made several demeaning comments to her in the presence of other 
employees.45 
After these comments, the plaintiff-employee complained to the president 
about his inappropriate behavior.46  In response, the president apologized, 
indicated that he was joking, and promised that he would stop.47  However, 
shortly thereafter, he remarked to the plaintiff, in the presence of other employees 
and while she was working on a deal with one of the company’s customers, 
“What did you do, promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?”48  The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that the president’s 
conduct was clearly abusive and offensive, but declined to hold the employer 
liable for hostile work environment because such conduct was not “so severe as to 
be expected to seriously affect [Harris’] psychological well-being.”49  In addition, 
the court concluded that “a reasonable woman manager under like circumstances 
would have been offended . . .  but [the president’s] conduct would not have risen 
to the level of interfering with that person’s work performance.”50  The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court but the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, reasoning that: 
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a 
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, 
even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Id. at 19. Some of the comments the president publicly stated to the employee were, “You’re a 
woman, what do you know” and “We need a man as the rental manager”; at least once, he told her 
she was “a dumb ass woman.”  Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them “go to 
the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris’] raise.”  The president also occasionally asked Harris and 
other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket. Finally, he was known to throw 
objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up 
and made sexual innuendos about Harris’ and other women’s clothing.” (internal citations 
omitted) Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 20. 
50 Id. 
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well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or 
keep them from advancing in their careers.  Moreover, even 
without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the 
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a 
work environment abusive to employees because of their race, 
gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of 
workplace equality.51 
In reaching this decision, the Court clarified that the critical question in a 
hostile work environment case is not whether the sexual harassment results in 
psychological harm but whether the conduct is abusive, as determined by a 
totality of the circumstances.52 
After Harris, the Court finally dealt with the issue regarding employer 
liability for supervisor harassment, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,53 and 
Faraghter v. City of Boca Raton.54  In these cases, ironically decided on the same 
day, the Court held that an employer will be vicariously liable for any supervisor 
harassment where a tangible employment action is present.55 The Court defined a 
tangible employment action as a “discharge, demotion, or undesirable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Id. at 22. 
52 Id. at 23. 
53 See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
54 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).   
55 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that:  
The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting a theory of vicarious liability based on § 
219(2)(d) of the Restatement, which provides that an employer ‘is not subject to 
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment 
unless . . . the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and 
there was reliance on apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the existence of the agency relation.’ It makes sense to hold an employer 
vicariously liable under Title VII for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made 
possible by use of his supervisory authority, and the aided-by-agency-relation 
principle of § 219(2)(d) provides an appropriate starting point for determining 
liability for the kind of harassment presented here.  
Id. at 777. 
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reassignment.”56  Where there is no tangible employment action taken against the 
plaintiff-employee, the employer will be entitled to assert the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense to liability and damages; however, such defense must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence.57   Pursuant to this defense, an 
employer must establish the following two elements:  (1) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing 
behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer, 
or failed to otherwise avoid harm.58  If the employer can successfully assert each 
prong, it will escape liability under Title VII.59  
Although the Court provided clarity regarding hostile work environments 
for employees and employers, a new issue, known as the equal opportunity 
harasser defense, emerged under its scope.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Id. at 778 (quoting “No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s 
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or 
undesirable reassignment”); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
57 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (quoting “When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending 
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745. 
58 See Faragher, 524 U.S.  at 807-09. 
59 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 745.  Another circuit split emerged 
regarding whether a constructive discharge (this occurs when an employee’s workplace 
environment is so filled with hostility that the only fitting response is to quit) is a tangible 
employment action.  Some courts held that a constructive discharge could never be a tangible 
employment action while others held that a constructive discharge could be a tangible employment 
action if it was precipitated by an official company act.  See also Stephen F. Befort and Sarah J. 
Gorajski, When Quitting Is Fitting: The Need for a Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive 
Discharge Standard in the Wake of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 596 
(2006).  The Court in Suder ultimately resolved this issue by holding that a constructive discharge 
will only amount to a tangible employment action when there is a precipitating official act. See 
generally Penn. State Police v. Suder, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
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III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER 
DEFENSE 
While the previous section thoroughly defines the contours of the hostile 
work environment claim, this section will detail the history of the equal 
opportunity harasser defense and explain how various courts have ruled on it.  
The equal opportunity harasser defense was first recognized in Barnes v. Costle.60  
In Barnes, a female employee with the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment by her male 
supervisor after he repeatedly solicited her for sexual favors, notwithstanding her 
consistent denial of his advances.61  The employee’s position was ultimately 
eliminated after she refused to submit to her supervisor’s advances.62  The district 
court granted the EPA’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the 
employee’s suit was not based on her sex, but instead was predicated on her 
refusal to engage in sexual activity with her supervisor, which was not protected 
under Title VII.63  The United States Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit reversed, 
reasoning that “[b]ut for her womanhood . . . her participation in sexual activity 
would never have been solicited. . . . Put another way, she became the target of 
her superior’s sexual desires because she was a woman, and was asked to bow to 
his demands as the price for holding her job.”64  Moreover, “[t]o say, then, that 
she was victimized in her employment simply because she declined the invitation 
is to ignore the asserted fact that she was invited only because she was a woman 
subordinate to the inviter in the hierarchy of agency personnel.”65  Interestingly, 
while the concept of the equal opportunity harasser was not an issue before the 
court, Judge Robinson, writing for the majority, laid the foundation for the 
defense.  In an unassuming footnote, Judge Robinson stated that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  In this case, the court seemed to limit the 
definition of “sex,” for purposes of Title VII, as only including biological differences between 
men and women and not in the context of sexual gratification. Id.  
61 Id. at 985.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 993. 
64 Id. at 990. 
65 Id. 
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[I]t is no answer to say that a homosexual superior of the same 
gender could impose a similar condition on a male subordinate by 
a heterosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate of either 
gender.  In each instance, the legal problem would be identical to 
that confronting us now the exaction of a condition which, but for 
his or her sex, the employee would not have faced. These 
situations, like that at bar, are to be distinguished from a bisexual 
superior who conditions the employment opportunities of a 
subordinate of either gender upon participation in a sexual affair. 
In the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual 
favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would 
apply to male and female employees alike.66 
After the Barnes decision, several circuits began to recognize the equal 
opportunity harasser defense.67  While the Supreme Court has yet to determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id. at 990 n.55.  The court in Ryczek reasoned that there are three possible interpretations for the 
term “bisexual” as noted in Barnes.  First, the language in Barnes could be interpreted to prohibit 
Title VII sexual harassment cases any time a supervisor is bisexual.  Alternatively, the language 
could mean that a supervisor is only immune from Title VII suits when there is evidence that the 
supervisor has actually harassed members of both sexes.  The last interpretation would require the 
court to interpret the word “sex” as used in Title VII to mean something more than gender.  
However, the last interpretation may have been eliminated by Supreme Court decisions implying 
that the “because of sex” requirement was congressionally intended to mean gender. See generally 
Ryczek v. Guest Servs. Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
67 See, e.g., Connell v. Principi, No. 04-1356, 2007 WL 3274185, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2007) 
(granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because male employees could not show that 
harassment by female supervisor was “because of sex” rather than just merely offensive sexual 
innuendos); Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 99 (W.D. N.C. 1990) (showing an example 
of harassment not based on sex where evidence showed supervisor publicly berated both male and 
female employees), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 946 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991). But see Ocheltree v. 
Scollon Prods. Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (illustrating that although men 
were also offended by the daily stream of sex-based behavior in the workplace, it did not mean 
that the conduct did not occur because of the plaintiff’s gender); Dattoli v. Principi, 332 F.3d 505, 
506 (8th Cir. 2003) (showing that an alleged harasser who had difficulty interacting with male and 
female co-workers indicated that his conduct towards the female plaintiff was not sex-based); 
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 399 (7th Cir. 2000) (demonstrating an equal opportunity 
harasser who escaped liability under Title VII); Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 964 
(8th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that whether the offensive conduct was directed at both men and 
women is important in determining if sex-based discrimination occurred); Pasqua v. Metro. Life 
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whether it is in fact a viable defense, many of the circuits that do recognize it have 
quoted the language in the Court’s decisions in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.68 
and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services69 “as tacit approval of the equal 
opportunity harasser defense as a means to avoid liability under Title VII.”70  
While Oncale was a case involving same-sex sexual harassment, the language the 
Court used in reaching its holding is suggestive, at least in some circuits, that the 
Supreme Court would recognize the equal opportunity harasser defense.  In 
Oncale, the plaintiff-employee worked as a laborer in an oil field for his 
employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (“Sundowner”).71  The employee 
alleged that his co-workers sexually assaulted him, threatened him with rape, and 
forced him to participate in embarrassing sexual acts in front of his colleagues.72  
The employee complained to his supervisors as well as the company’s Safety 
Compliance Clerk; however, no action was taken.73  As a result, the employee 
quit because he felt that if he remained in his prior position he ultimately would 
have been forcibly raped.74 
The employee brought an action for discrimination based on sex against 
Sundowner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ins., 101 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that harassment inflicted on both males and 
females in same setting does not create an actionable claim of harassment based on sex); Henson 
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904  (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that because male and female 
workers were treated in a like manner, plaintiffs would have no remedy under Title VII); 
Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that the 
plaintiff’s willing and frequent involvement in sexual innuendos prevalent in her workplace 
negated any hostile work environment), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991). 
68 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
69 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
70 Mark J. McCullough, Note, One is a Claim, Two is a Defense: Bringing an End to the Equal 
Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 469, 476 (2005). 
71 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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Louisiana.75  The court held that “a male has no cause of action under Title VII 
for harassment by male co-workers.”76  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed and 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for a determination on the 
validity of same-sex sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII.77  The 
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that claims alleging 
“sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment are actionable 
under Title VII.”78  Specifically, the Court reasoned that Title VII’s reference to 
discrimination “because of sex” is intended to protect both men and women from 
unequal treatment in places of employment.79  However, while the Court did 
extend protection to the plaintiff-employee in Oncale, the Court clearly indicated 
that not all workplace harassment will result in a claim of sexual harassment.80  In 
support of this position, the Oncale Court specifically referenced Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Harris, which as some courts have opined, lends 
support for the idea that the Court would recognize the equal opportunity harasser 
defense. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one 
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed.”81 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
78 Id. at 82.  When the harasser is of the same sex as the plaintiff-employee, the Court held that 
there are several frameworks that a plaintiff-employee can use to establish that such harassment 
occurred because of sex, including:  (1) showing that the harasser is homosexual; (2) showing that 
the harasser is motivated by a general hostility towards the presence of employees of the same sex 
in the workplace; or (3) showing how the harasser treated men versus women in a mixed-sex 
workplace. Interestingly, with respect to the second framework, a general hostility towards a 
particular group would not be a viable option if the same-sex harasser worked in an environment 
that was dominated by one group. Id. at 70, 80-81. 
79 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 
U.S. 669, 682 (1983)). 
80 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
81 Id. at 80. 
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IV. INTERPRETING THE “BECAUSE OF SEX” LANGUAGE 
The fundamental basis for the equal opportunity harasser defense lies 
within the meaning of the phrase “because of sex”82 which, unfortunately, is 
extremely vague.83  Since the inception of Title VII, courts and commentators 
have continuously examined, theorized, defined, refined, accepted, and expelled 
various ideas and approaches to the “because of sex” question.  In fact, the phrase 
“because of sex” could mean a number of things, such as: the biological 
differences between men and women; gender84; sexual preference; gender 
stereotypes and identity; sexual imagery and epithets; or sexual behavior.85  
Congress’ failure to specify which of these definitions it intended for the “because 
of sex” language to encompass has led to considerable confusion, as courts have 
struggled to adequately determine what conduct is sufficient to violate Title VII.86  
Due to the ambiguity of the “because of sex” language, courts and scholars have 
disagreed as to whether the equal opportunity harasser defense should be 
available in sexual harassment cases based on hostile work environments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Deborah Zalesne, Lessons From Equal Opportunity Harasser Doctrine: Challenging Sex-
Specific Appearance and Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 535, 537 (2007). 
83 David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1740-41 (2002). 
84 Zalesne, supra note 82, at 546 n.75 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. Inc., 
224 F.3d 701, 701 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean 
‘biological male or biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation”)).  Within 
this Article, gender generally refers to the social construction of roles, actions, attitudes, behaviors, 
and attributes that society as a whole considers appropriate for men and women, whereas sex 
generally refers to the biological and physiological aspects that define the differences between 
men and women. 
85  Zalesne, supra note 82, at 546 nn.75-79.  
86 In addition to failing to define sex in Title VII, its inclusion in the statute was motivated by one 
congressman’s efforts to thwart the bill’s approval.  See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 
1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A 
Need to Re-examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII’s Ban on Discrimination “Because Of” 
Sex, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 231, 268-69 (1996-1997). 
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Some commentators and scholars argue that the evolution of Title VII 
through the judicial process has allowed the primary goal of Title VII to become 
distorted or eviscerated; thus, allowing the equal opportunity harasser defense to 
gain a foothold and, in some instances, flourish.87  In these jurisdictions, several 
legal theories have been adopted to avoid the harsh results of its application, 
including:  (A) eliminating the causation requirement; (B) conducting an 
individualized analysis of the harassment directed at each employee without 
considering whether the harasser was an equal opportunist; (C) adopting a “sex 
per se” rule; and (D) evaluating the comparative seriousness of the harassment 
directed at each plaintiff. 
A. Elimination of the Causation Requirement 
One approach for dealing with the problems created by the equal 
opportunity harasser defense is to eliminate the requirement of causation.88  While 
Professor Gudel’s article primarily focuses on the elimination of the causation 
requirement in mixed motive cases,89 his argument for the elimination of 
causation is equally viable in the context of sexual harassment cases.90  His 
primary point is that “placing the burden on the plaintiff in a Title VII case to 
establish ‘but for’ causation is simply incompatible with the nature of Title VII as 
a remedial statute.”91  Further, by equating the “because of sex” requirement to a 
“but for” test, a plaintiff is placed in an eminent position of failure.92  By using 
that particular assessment, the offending conduct becomes isolated to a specific 
incident of harassment in a chain of events, which may have occurred in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See generally Zalesne, supra note 82; Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1709. 
88 Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem 
in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 30 (1991). 
89 A mixed motive case is one that involves two motives, one that is discriminatory and another 
that is non-discriminatory. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); DIANNE 
AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE 
WORKPLACE 157-60, n.6-7 (7th ed. 2004). 
90 See generally Gudel, supra note 88. 
91 Id. at 32 (internal citations omitted). 
92 Id. at 30. 
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producing the final outcome. The purpose of Title VII is to make individuals, 
subjected to discrimination, able to seek justice against their perpetrators for the 
purpose of furthering social policy considerations.93  Title VII was not enacted for 
the purpose of establishing a new tort action.94  Instead, it should be treated as a 
statute prohibiting offending conduct.95  As such, this purpose can only be truly 
effectuated through elimination of the causation requirement.   This idea is further 
supported by the fact that it is the defendant’s own conduct that creates the 
problem of discrimination.96 
An excellent example of how courts dispense with the causation 
requirement is provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in McDonnell v. Cisneros.97  In Cisneros, two plaintiff-employees, 
Boockmeier (male) and McDonnell (female), brought suit against the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), alleging that they were subjected 
to a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharges.98  According to the 
plaintiffs, someone provided the Secretary for HUD with two anonymous letters 
falsely accusing them of sexual misconduct.99  The letters specifically provided 
that “McDonnell was Boockmeier’s ‘in-house sex slave,’ who provided sexual 
favors to him in exchange for more rapid promotion and other preferential 
treatment.”100  Thereafter, HUD initiated an investigation into the allegations 
contained in the letter.101  The plaintiffs claimed that the investigations were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 98. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 32 (stating “This intuition is usually coupled with another one: that fairness requires that 
the burden of proof in mixed motive cases be placed on the defendant because the defendant’s 
actions have created the problem of proof.”) Id. 
97 McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996). 
98 Id. at 257. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Because the plaintiffs were employees of the Inspector General’s Office—the office that 
normally conducts investigations involving these types of complaint—HUD retained outside 
federal investigators from the Defense Department. Id. 
78         Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice                  [Vol. 1 	  
conducted in a hostile and unprofessional manner.102  In fact, the investigators 
indicated to several of the interviewees that it was “their personal belief that the 
plaintiffs were guilty of the charges made in the anonymous letters.”103  As a 
result of: 
[t]he manner in which the investigation was conducted . . . even 
more lurid rumors [arose], widely circulated within HUD, 
including rumors of incest and other sexual deviance on the part of 
Boockmeier and a rumor that Boockmeier was the true father of 
McDonnell’s child. These rumors made the plaintiffs pariahs. Male 
employees of HUD shunned McDonnell, female employees 
Boockmeier.”104 
Notwithstanding the investigators’ questionable tactics, the plaintiffs were 
completely exonerated.105  However, in order to remove the veil of impropriety, 
Boockmeier was reassigned to HUD’s Washington, D.C. office for ninety days, 
“ostensibly to dilute any perception that he had a sexual relationship with 
McDonnell.”106 Thereafter, “Boockmeier filed an informal complaint that the 
treatment by the investigators constituted a form of sexual harassment forbidden 
by Title VII.”107  Approximately one year later, McDonnell also filed a claim for 
sexual harassment as well as a claim of retaliation, alleging that “management 
ostracized, disdained, and ridiculed her in retaliation for her having filed 
complaints.”108  After McDonnell filed this complaint, Boockmeier received 
notice that his original ninety-day transfer was changed to a permanent transfer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Id. at 258. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 The court dismissed McDonnell’s retaliation claim, reasoning that “there was no causal 
connection between McDonnell’s filing of the complaints and the alleged retaliation against her,” 
because she was ostracized, disdained, and ridiculed both prior to and after the filing of the 
complaint.  Therefore, because nothing changed, it could not be said that these actions were the 
result of her filing the complaint. Id. at 258-59. 
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because he failed to prevent McDonnell from filing her complaint.109  In response, 
Boockmeier also filed a claim for retaliation.110 
With respect to the hostile work environment claims, the court held that 
the district court’s decision to dismiss was correct because the Federal Tort 
Claims Act barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the federal investigators.111  In 
reaching its decision, the court addressed the government’s argument that the 
plaintiffs’ claims of sexual harassment could not be established because the 
harassment was equally directed at both employees.112  In rejecting this argument, 
the court criticized other courts that have interpreted the “because of sex” 
language to require a difference in biological sex as a necessary condition of 
sexual harassment.113   Instead, the court directed attention away from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Id. at 258. 
110 Id. In regards to Boockmeier’s retaliation claim, the court held that while 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) prohibits discrimination “against any individual . . . because he has made a charge . . . or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Id. at 262. Boockmeier 
nevertheless pled sufficient facts to establish a claim of retaliation.  Id. at 262.  The court reasoned 
that while it was clear that the situation presented by Boockmeier was not clearly contemplated by 
the legislature, it was necessary to hold that such a claim for retaliation could be established based 
on the facts of this case to avoid an absurd result whereby “employers could obtain immunity from 
the retaliation statute by directing their subordinates to take steps to prevent other workers (as by 
threat of dismissal or other discipline) from complaining about discrimination.”  Id. at 262. 
111 Id. at 259. The Court stated that:  
If, as alleged, the investigators in this case told the people whom they were 
interviewing that the plaintiffs had engaged in job-related sexual misconduct, 
then, because the statement was false and defamatory, the investigators 
committed the tort of defamation, for which the plaintiffs could sue them. But 
the investigators would have a defense of qualified immunity. . . .  The Tort 
Claims Act makes specific provision for suits arising out of abuses by federal 
investigators in a proviso to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) that conspicuously omits 
defamation from the list of abuses that can impose liability on the United States 
under the Act. The plaintiffs are trying to use Title VII, which does not have any 
specific provision with regard to federal investigators, to amend the Tort Claims 
Act and circumvent the Westfall Act.”   
Id. at 261. 
112  Id. at 260. 
113  Id. 
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“because of sex” language and focused its attention on the exceedingly perverse 
outcome that would result “if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his 
company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care to harass sexually an 
occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were female.”114  This shift 
in the court’s analysis marked a realization that applying the “but for” causation 
test in cases with an equal opportunity harasser thwarts the purpose of Title VII.  
Thus, in order to reach what it considered to be the most reasonable conclusion 
under the circumstances, the court refused to apply a strict “but for” causation 
determination.115	  
B. Applying an Individualized Analysis 
Another way to mitigate the equal opportunity harasser defense is to 
conduct an individualized analysis to determine whether the alleged harassment 
was “because of sex.”  Under an individualized analysis of the “because of sex” 
requirement, courts modify the traditional “but for” determination by conducting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Zalesne, supra note 82, at 550 (quoting “Some 
commentators have advocated abandoning the causation requirement entirely, and some courts 
have gotten around the problem by simply directing attention away from the ‘because of sex’ 
language.”)  The elimination of the causation requirement is also buttressed by the fact that:  
[A] difference in sex is not a necessary condition of sexual activity and hence 
(most courts think) of sexual harassment. . . . There is plenty of homosexual 
activity these days (perhaps all days); some of it occurs in the workplace; and 
some involves the extorting of sexual favors by superiors, or other behaviors 
that when heterosexual expose employers to liability for sexual harassment in 
violation of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination.  And then there is the 
specter of the perfectly bisexual harasser- a number three on the Kinsey Scale of 
sexual preference—who by definition is indifferent to the sex of his victims and 
so engages in sexual harassment without discriminating on the basis of sex.   
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996).  Alfred Kinsey created what is 
affectionately known as the Kinsey Scale.  The Kinsey Scale is a numerical continuum, ranging 
from 0 to 6, which measures an individual’s sexual preference.  On the scale, an exclusively 
heterosexual person is represented by a score of 0, whereas as an exclusively homosexual person 
is represented by a score of 6.  Thus, a score of 3 would represent an individual who is indifferent 
to sexual preference, a perfect bisexual. See ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, & 
CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 (1948).  
115 See McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 260.  
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a closer examination of the harasser’s conduct.116  Rather than stopping with a 
facial inquiry and dismissing a case because the harasser’s conduct was directed 
at both females and males, the court would accept the premise that both females 
and males can be victims of the same harasser, thereby sustaining an actionable 
cause.117  In order to establish this burden, the employee presents one of the three 
types of evidence listed in Oncale as proof that the harassment was because of 
sex.118  Next, the court isolates and examines the conduct of the harasser solely as 
it relates to the plaintiff and without regard for the harassment of any other 
employee of the opposite sex.119  Through this approach, the inquiry properly 
focuses on exactly what Title VII was created to remedy—individual 
discrimination.120  The claim is not founded on extraneous facts outside the 
individual claim that are “unrelated to the instances of discrimination.”121  More 
accurately, the court will address the conduct of the harasser as it specifically 
relates to the victim.122  Under this line of inquiry, sex-specific conduct that 
would be dismissed under a traditional analysis, because the harasser utilized a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Shylah Miles, Two Wrongs Do Not Make A Defense: Eliminating The Equal-Opportunity-
Harasser-Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603, 623 (2001); see generally McCullough, supra note 70; 
Zalesne, supra note 82. An individualized analysis approach:  
[W]ould examine each plaintiff’s claim separately without regard to other claims 
against the same defendant and without requiring comparative evidence showing 
that the other sex was treated differently.  As noted in Brown v. Henderson, “[i]n 
determining whether an employee has been discriminated against ‘because of 
such individual’s . . . sex,’ the courts have consistently emphasized that the 
ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not the 
relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.”  
Zalesne, supra note 82, at 551 (citing Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246 (2001) (alterations in 
original) (internal citations omitted). 
117 See Miles, supra at note 116, at 623. 
118 Id. at 624. See supra note 78 (discussing the three ways that an employee can prove a claim 
under Oncale).   
119  Id. at 623.  
120  Id. at 624.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
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similar form of conduct on both males and females, would instead be 
determinative in establishing that the harasser’s behavior was gender-based.123 
This approach was applied by the district court in Chiapuzio v. BLT 
Operating Corp.124 In Chiapuzio, four plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually 
harassed by a male supervisor.125  The plaintiffs consisted of a married couple, a 
married man, and an individual female.126 The married couple alleged that the 
supervisor regularly and consistently made sexually abusive remarks, primarily 
based on the premise that the supervisor would do a much better job of sexually 
pleasing the wife than her husband.127  The other married man alleged that he and 
his wife128 were subjected to conduct that was substantially similar to the conduct 
alleged by the married couple—the most egregious act occurred when the 
supervisor offered the married man’s wife “$100 dollars if she would sit on his 
lap.”129  The individual female alleged that the supervisor made “an incessant 
series of sexual advances” towards her.130  Each of the plaintiffs complained 
about the supervisor’s conduct, but the employer took no action.131  After the 
plaintiffs filed suit, the employer argued that there was no discrimination 
“because of sex” since the supervisor harassed both the female and the male 
employees equally; therefore, the harassment could not have occurred “but for” 
their gender.132  The court disagreed, reasoning that the supervisor’s harassment 
fell within the ambit of Title VII because his primary purpose was to demean each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Id.  
124 Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993). 
125 Id. at 1335. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id.  The married man’s wife was not a party to the litigation because she was not an employee 
of BLT. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131  Id. 
132 Id. at 1336.  
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of the parties specifically because of his or her gender.133  Instead of applying an 
analysis that would compare the harassing conduct directed at all of these 
employees as a whole, the court determined that each employee’s complaint 
should be reviewed individually.134Accordingly, the court concluded that each 
employee, individually, had been subjected to sexual harassment.135 
This approach was also recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.136 In Steiner, the plaintiff-employee’s 
evidence established that her supervisor was abusive to both men and women, but 
that his abuse of women was different because of his use of “sexual epithets, 
offensive, explicit references to women’s bodies, and sexual conduct.”137 The 
court further reasoned that even if the supervisor “used sexual epithets equal in 
intensity and in an equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot 
thereby ‘cure’ his conduct toward women.  Ellison unequivocally directs us to 
consider what is offensive and hostile to a reasonable woman.”138  The court 
reiterated that: 
[w]e . . . prefer to analyze harassment from the victim’s 
perspective. A complete understanding of the victim’s view 
requires, among other things, an analysis of the different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit court stated:  
An odd and inefficient result would obtain if the plaintiffs were unable to bring 
one lawsuit as a group, but could successfully bring individual suits against the 
defendant.  Thus, this Court concludes that if an individual plaintiff could sue 
BLT and survive summary judgment, then the plaintiffs as a group also should 
survive.  
Id. at 1338.  
136  Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).  
137 Id. at 1462. The court specifically found that while the defendant referred to male employees as 
“assholes” this language did not relate to their gender, but that defendant’s references to female 
employees as “dumb fucking broads” and “fucking cunts” clearly centered on gender. Id. at 1462. 
138 Id. at 1464 (quoting Ellison v. Brandy, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider 
unobjectionable may offend many women.139 
As this section demonstrates, although the individualized analysis model 
does not eliminate the “because of sex” requirement, it does refine the basis upon 
which that determination is made.140  By applying this approach, courts review the 
sufficiency of evidence as it applies only to the harasser’s conduct towards the 
individual complainant—with no consideration of the harasser’s conduct toward 
other employees of the same sex—, thereby allowing the court to limit application 
of the equal opportunity harasser defense.141 
C. The “Sex Per Se” Rule 
The “sex per se” rule is a literal interpretation of the “because of sex” 
requirement.  Under this approach, “sexual conduct in the workplace is always, 
without more, ‘because of sex.’ ”142 Application of the “sex per se” rule, however, 
does not necessitate that all sexually based conduct result in a valid claim of sex 
discrimination.143  Instead, this approach lightens the employee’s burden of 
proving the “but for” causation.144  In essence, once an employee establishes that 
the conduct is “sex related,” the causation component of the hostile work 
environment claim is established.145  This approach recognizes that sexually 
harassing conduct does not have to be motivated by the harasser’s sexual interest 
in the victim and that the intent of the harasser could be immaterial; therefore, it 
should not be considered.146  Proponents of this argument argue that this 
straightforward approach will eliminate the confusion caused by the “because of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Id. 
140 See generally Miles, supra note 116.   
141 Id. 
142 Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1705. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1719 (noting that desire-based “but for” causation theories contain misplaced emphasis 
on the sexual behavior and motivations of the harasser). 
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sex” requirement.147  According to proponents of the “sex per se” rule, the 
traditional “but for” theory of causation does not work well in sex discrimination 
cases for two reasons.148  First, under the “but for” theory, the primary 
consideration focuses on the subjective intent and sexual behavior of the 
harasser.149  This focus is misplaced because: 
[F]actual inquiry into the harasser’s actual motivation could mean 
an intrusion into his inner mind: such an inquiry would likely be 
murky, unduly psychological, and traumatic for everyone 
involved—not just the alleged harasser, but also the other 
participants in the litigation who would undergo the ordeal of 
learning more than they would want to know about the harasser’s 
psyche.150 
Furthermore, determining the subjective intent and behavior of the 
harasser often requires that the employee introduce evidence of the harasser’s 
conduct outside of the workplace in order to sufficiently prove whether his 
conduct within the workplace is “because of sex.”151   To meet this burden, an 
employee “might be entitled fairly to open discovery into the harasser’s sex life to 
identify how, and toward whom, he makes sexual overtures.  Yet, in the end, the 
complexities of sexuality might render this unseemly and difficult inquiry 
indeterminate.”152  As a result, the “but for” theory of causation may coerce an 
unreasonable expedition into the private life of the harasser and place an 
insurmountable burden on the employee to make such inquiry.153 
A second criticism of the “but for” theory of causation is that it may 
exclude from coverage, under Title VII, harassment that is not motivated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Id. at 1705.  
148 Id. at 1720. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1746. 
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sexual desire.154  This is highly problematic because sexual harassment in the 
workplace is not always motivated by sexual desire.155  In fact, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest “that men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the 
workplace primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire.’ 
Psychological studies, for example, have correlated workplace sexual harassment 
with strong beliefs in sex-role stereotypes.”156 
As a response to these criticisms, the “sex per se” rule was first applied by 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.157  In Robinson, the plaintiff-employee sued her 
employer for sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment.158  
Specifically, the employee alleged that the workplace environment was littered 
with pictures of nude and partially nude women, that other male employees were 
allowed to read pornographic magazines in the workplace without sanction, and 
that several employees made inappropriate comments about the pictures in the 
presence of the plaintiff-employee’s presence and directed inappropriate sexual 
comments towards her.159  The employer argued that the employee’s claim was 
not valid under Title VII because the harassment did not occur because of sex.160  
The court disagreed, reasoning that the employer’s workplace environment 
created a barrier to the progress of women and conveyed a clear message that they 
did not belong unless they were willing to “subvert their identities to the sexual 
stereotypes prevalent” in the employer’s workplace.161  Moreover, the court 
reasoned that the employee’s evidence suggested “that the presence of the 
pictures, even if not directed at offending a particular female employee, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Id. at 1753. 
155 Id. at 1721. 
156 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
157 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (M.D. Fla. 1991).   
158 Id. at 1520 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1520-22. 
161 Id. at 1523. 
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sexualizes the work environment to the detriment of all female employees.”162 
Relying on this same reasoning, the Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. City of 
Belleville, also applied the “sex per se” rule.163  In Doe, two teenage brothers (“H” 
and “J”),164 who were hired by the City to perform yard work, quit after only two 
months of employment and brought suit against the City, alleging that they were 
sexually harassed by their former male co-workers.165 The district court granted 
summary judgment in the City’s favor, reasoning that the harassment occurred 
because the boys were perceived as homosexuals, which the court opined is not 
protected under Title VII since the harassers were not motivated by any sexual 
desire for the boys.166  The court of appeals reversed, holding that sexually 
explicit conduct alone is generally sufficient to establish that the harassment 
occurred because of sex.167  It further reasoned that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Id.  
163 Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir. 1997). 
164 For the most part, J was spared from the sexual harassment.   Instead, J’s co-workers would 
merely tease him about the fact that he was overweight.  However, on one occasion the comments 
did have a sexual undertone.  After H contracted poison ivy, Dawe asked J if he also had it from 
having anal sex with his brother.  Id. at 567. 
165 Id. at 566. The facts of the case were undisputed and were uncontested by the City. Id. at 567. 
Between the two brothers, H was subjected to the most harassment. H’s co-workers would 
frequently call him a “queer,” “fag,” “bitch,” and urge him to “go back to San Francisco with the 
rest of the queers.” His co-workers would also repeatedly inquire into whether H was a “boy or a 
girl.” In addition, one co-worker in particular, Dawe, called “H his bitch” and regularly threatened 
to take H “out to the woods” and “get [him] up the ass.” These comments were made in the 
presence of other employees, prompting them to join in on the sexually charged banter, often 
remarking that Dawe should “take [H] out and ‘get a piece of that young ass.’” On one occasion, 
H’s supervisor indicated that he was going to take H out to the woods, asked Dawe whether H was 
“tight or loose,” and asked whether H “would . . . scream” if he was sodomized. The harassment 
directed at H culminated in a physical attack when Dawe trapped H against a wall, grabbed H’s 
testicles, and announced in front of the other employees, “I guess he’s a guy.” It was after this 
incident that the brothers decided to quit. Id. at 566-67. 
166 The district court found the deposition testimony of the boys compelling on this issue wherein 
the boys admitted that the harassers never “made a sexual advance” toward either of them, “asked 
for sexual favors,” asked to “have sex” with them, or had physical contact with them “of a sexual 
nature.” Id. at 567-68. 
167 Id. at 590.  
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[p]roof that the harasser was motivated to target (or in practice did 
target) one gender and not the other may be necessary where the 
harassment is not on its face sexual, as we have discussed, but such 
proof would seem unnecessary when the harassment itself is 
imbued with sexual overtones.168 
In reaching this decision, the court in Doe focused more on the conduct 
and its effect on the plaintiff, not on the subjective intent of the harasser and 
whether or not he was in fact motivated by some sort of sexual desire.169 In doing 
so, the court deflected attention away from the causation requirement altogether 
and onto considerations it found to be more critical to the outcome. These courts 
presumably took their lead from Supreme Court cases that use “because of sex” in 
the analysis but do not elucidate the causal requirement implicit in Title VII.170 
While the “sex per se” rule is a viable approach, there is some evidence 
that the Supreme Court would reject this idea based on the following language 
from Oncale:  “We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment 
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely 
because the words used have sexual content or connotations.”171  This language 
suggests that mere proof of sexually related harassment is insufficient to establish 
a prima facie case of hostile work environment without establishing the requisite 
level of causation.  Although the Court has yet to definitively rule that such 
interpretation is inconsistent with Title VII, the language from Oncale may render 
the “sex per se” rule less attractive than one of the other three approaches to the 
equal opportunity harasser defense. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Id. at 577-78. 
169 Id. at 590 (quoting “Men sexually harass women in the workplace for reasons other than sexual 
desire; but that does not detract either from the sexual content of the harassment or from the 
uniquely intrusive and denigrating impact sexual harassment has upon the women who experience 
it.”).  
170 Zalesne, supra note 82, at 550-51.   
171 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (1998). 
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D. Comparative Seriousness 
A fourth approach towards interpreting the “because of sex” requirement 
requires that courts analyze the comparative seriousness of the harassment 
directed at plaintiff-employees in comparison to the harassment leveled at other 
employees.172  As such, if the harassment directed at the plaintiff-employee can be 
perceived as having a greater effect on the plaintiff from a protected class, as 
opposed to a class of unprotected persons, then harassment has occurred because 
of sex and the equal opportunity harasser defense is not applicable.173  The Eighth 
Circuit in Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc., provides an excellent example 
of how courts apply the comparative seriousness test.174  In Kopp, the evidence 
established that the defendant doctor verbally and physically harassed the female 
plaintiff-employee as well as other men and women in the workplace.175  The 
defendant asserted that because he targeted both males and females, it could not 
be shown that the discrimination was based on gender.176 Disagreeing, the court 
held that the incidents involving the female employees were “of a more serious 
nature than those involving male employees” and that a “fact-finder could 
conclude that [the defendant’s] treatment of women is worse than his treatment of 
men.”177  The defendant’s harassing conduct was unequally balanced because he 
harassed ten women but only four men.178  Even more telling was the fact that the 
defendant’s alleged abuses of women involved actual physical contact and harm, 
while all of the incidents involving male employees consisted only of a raised 
voice or a verbal insult.179 
In summary, the comparative serious test analyzes the severity of the 
harassment directed at each victim individually, then evaluates the conduct on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  See Miles, supra note 116. 
173  Id. 
174 Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys. Inc., 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993). 
175 Id. at 269.  
176 See id. at 265. 
177 Id. at 269. 
178  Id. 
179 Id. at 269-70. 
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comparative sliding scale, in relationship to each party’s claim, to determine 
whether such conduct is “because of sex.” 
V. EQUALIZING THE BURDENS OF PROOF 
While each of the aforementioned theories provides some help to plaintiff-
employees in establishing a claim of sexual harassment against an equal 
opportunity harasser, they each fail to adequately balance the policies underlying 
Title VII.  It is highly unlikely that courts will completely eliminate the causation 
requirement, especially given its importance both in determining whether the 
plaintiff actually has a viable claim of harassment and ensuring that defendant-
employers are not unreasonably subjected to expensive litigation.  With respect to 
the individualized analysis, it suffers from the fact that it requires a court to 
isolate the conduct of the harasser when such analysis undercuts the idea of 
evaluating the entire scope of the conduct in its totality.  As for the “sex per se” 
rule, this theory also seems unlikely to gain widespread adoption given the 
Supreme Court’s language in Oncale, where it reasoned that “[w]e have never 
held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is 
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have 
sexual content or connotations.”180   Given this language, it seems improbable that 
the Court would automatically hold that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination by the mere suggestion that harassment has occurred “because 
of sex.”181  Finally, the comparative seriousness theory places an additional and 
unreasonable burden on the plaintiff-employee, namely, that the plaintiff-
employee must establish that the harm she suffered is greater than that of the harm 
another employee suffered.  Title VII was not intended to force such an absurd 
legal responsibility. 
Due to the inadequacies in the approaches discussed in the previous 
paragraphs, courts should be willing to recognize an exception to the traditional 
approach for allocating the burdens of production and proof when the equal 
opportunity harasser defense is asserted in a sexual harassment claim based on 
hostile work environment.  In hostile work environment cases involving single-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.  
181  See supra note 78-80 and accompanying text. 
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sex harassment, cases not involving an equal opportunity harasser, courts can 
continue to apply the current standard for determining causation, wherein the 
plaintiff is required to prove that the discrimination occurred “but for” his or her 
sex.182  However, in cases where the harassment is perpetrated by an equal 
opportunity harasser, courts should place a larger burden on the employer, similar 
to how they treat disparate treatment cases where there is a mixed motive.183 
Under my suggested approach, if an employer asserts the equal 
opportunity harasser defense in response to a valid claim of sexual harassment 
based on hostile work environment, this defense would be treated like an 
affirmative defense, and the employer would be required to establish the burdens 
of both production and persuasion in establishing that the harassing employee was 
an equal opportunity harasser.  To meet this burden, the employer would have to 
establish proof of what I refer to below as a “reverse Oncale” analysis.184  There 
are two primary bases upon which the motivation behind my approach is 
supported.  First, there is an established precedent for adopting different 
frameworks in employment discrimination claims based on the same category of 
discrimination in the context of disparate treatment claims.  Second, given the 
heightened pleading standards imposed by Twombly and Iqbal, it is imperative to 
more fairly allocate the burdens of proof and production. 
A. Judicial Acceptance of Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination Claims 
While the concept of disparate treatment is relatively straight forward, not 
all factual circumstances involving disparate treatment are the same.185  For 
example, an employer’s adverse employment decision could be the result of one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra note 88-89. 
184 See supra pp. 99-100. 
185 Disparate treatment cases are usually similar in that they typically involve a situation where an 
employer makes an adverse employment decision such as a failure to hire, a failure to promote, a 
demotion or a reassignment to a less desirable position. See DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 61-62, 68 (7th 
ed. 2004). 
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of the following:  a single motive, a mixed motive, after acquired evidence or a 
pattern or practice of discrimination.186  Each of these types of disparate treatment 
cases invokes a different analytical framework for determining whether a 
plaintiff-employee has suffered a cognizable claim of disparate treatment.  Given 
that courts are willing to adopt different frameworks for analyzing different 
categories of disparate treatment cases, courts should be willing to do the same in 
the context of hostile work environment cases. 
In single motive disparate treatment cases, there is a single motive behind 
an employer’s alleged discrimination, and the plaintiff-employee is attempting to 
establish the employer’s discriminatory intent with circumstantial evidence. The 
appropriate framework for analyzing such claims is known as the McDonald 
Douglas burden shifting framework as set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in McDonald Douglas v. Green.187  In McDonnell Douglas, an employee 
was laid off due to a general reduction in the employer’s labor force.188  The 
employee was later arrested for participating in a “stall in”189 to protest the 
layoffs.  The employer thereafter advertised for an open position and the 
employee applied for it.190  The employer declined to hire the employee because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 157-60, n.6-7 (7th ed. 2004). 
187 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
188 Id. at 793. 
189 In context, a “stall-in” is an effort to block access to the company. Disgruntled employees 
staged the “stall-in” by stopping their cars in strategic locations, thereby cutting off road access to 
the company. The Court explained this in detail, stating:  
[F]ive teams, each consisting of four cars would ‘tie up’ five main access roads 
into McDonnell at the time of the morning rush hour. The drivers of the cars 
were instructed to line up next to each other completely blocking the 
intersections or roads. The drivers were also instructed to stop their cars, turn off 
the engines, pull the emergency brake, raise all windows, lock the doors, and 
remain in their cars until the police arrived. The plan was to have the cars 
remain in position for one hour.  
Id. at 794. 
190 Id. at 796. 
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of his participation in the “stall-in.”191  The employee brought suit against the 
employer, alleging that the employer’s decision not to rehire him violated Title 
VII.192  The district court found for the employer, reasoning that the employer’s 
motivation for not rehiring the employee was based on his involvement in the 
illegal demonstrations rather than his legitimate participation in civil rights 
activities.193  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the employee 
had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that the employer had 
failed to meet its burden of defense against the employee’s claim and, therefore, 
ruled against the employer.194  The employer appealed and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the appellate court that the employee had established a 
prima facie case of discrimination; however, it reversed the appellate court’s 
conclusion that the employer had failed to carry its burden of defense against the 
claim.195  The Court reasoned that the employer’s only burden in a single motive 
case of disparate treatment, based on circumstantial evidence, is rather low—the 
employer must only produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the discrimination.196  As the Court concluded, the employer met this burden 
by producing evidence that the reason for its refusal to rehire the employee was 
based on his participation in illegal activity.197  However, the Court also held that 
the employee would be given an opportunity to rebut this presumption by proving 
that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was merely 
pretextual.198 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 797. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 798.  
196 Id. at 802. 
197 Id. at 807. 
198 The Court suggested that the employee in McDonnell Douglas might accomplish this by 
introducing:    
(1) evidence that other employees participated in “stall-ins” and/or “sit-ins” yet 
were rehired, (2) evidence of how the employee was treated prior to the 
reduction in force, (3) evidence of how the employer responded to the 
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As demonstrated by the Court’s conclusion, McDonnell Douglas sets forth 
the proper burden-shifting framework for analyzing single motive disparate 
treatment cases where an employee is trying to prove his or her case with 
circumstantial evidence.199  Under this framework, the employee has the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: 
[(1)] the belongs to a racial minority; [(2)] he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
[(3)] despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and [(4)] after his 
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued 
to seek applicants from persons with complainant’s 
qualifications.200 
Once an employee meets this burden, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the employee has suffered from discrimination.201  To rebut this presumption, 
the burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for 
rejecting the employee.202  At this point, the only burden on the employer is the 
burden of production.203    Once the employer meets this very minimal burden, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employee’s participation in lawful conduct, (4) evidence of how the employer’s 
policy and general treatment of minority employees in the workplace, and (5) 
evidence of statistical disparities between whites and minority employees.   
Id. at 804-05. 
199 Id. at 802. 
200 Id.  
201 As the Court noted, it is willing to presume that discrimination has occurred once an employee 
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination:  
[B]ecause we know from our experience that more often than not people do not 
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in 
the business setting.  Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant 
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more 
likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some 
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.  
Id. at 802-03. 
202 Id. at 802. 
203 Id.  
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burdens of production and persuasion merge and the employee must establish that 
the employer’s articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.204 
The scenario described above, however, involves only single motive 
discrimination cases.  In mixed motive cases where an employer has two possible 
motives for the alleged disparate treatment—one legitimate and one 
discriminatory—the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not 
work.  As a result, courts analyzing mixed motive cases utlize the framework that 
was adopted by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.205 
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff-employee was a senior manager with a 
large accounting firm.206  After she had been employed for approximately five 
years, she was recommended for partnership status, pending a formal vote by the 
partners.207  The firm did not accept or reject her for partnership; instead, the firm 
decided to put a “hold” on her candidacy until the following year.208  The 
following year, when the employee was not granted partnership, she quit and sued 
the firm, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her sex.209  More 
specifically, she alleged that she did not earn partnership in the firm because she 
failed to conform to the firm’s gender expectations of women in the workplace.210  
In support of her claim, she introduced evidence of several partners’ comments 
that (1) she was “macho,” (2) she was “overcompensated for being a woman,” (3) 
she should take “a course at charm school,” (4) her use of profanity in the 
workplace was unbecoming for a woman, and (5) she had “matured from a tough-
talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an authoritative, 
formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner] candidate.”211   However, the 
employee’s most compelling evidence of gender discrimination was provided by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Id. at 804. 
205 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
206 Id. at 231. 
207 Id. at 232-33. 
208 Id. at 233. 
209 Id. at 231-32. 
210 Id. at 234-36. 
211 Id. at 235. 
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the partner who informed her that her partnership candidacy would be placed on 
hold.212  In an effort to “help” her in future efforts to obtain partnership, this 
partner informed the employee that she should “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.”213 The employee also bolstered her case with testimony by a social 
psychologist that gender stereotyping likely influenced the firm’s selection 
process.214 
The district court held that the firm had “unlawfully discriminated against 
[the employee] on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to 
partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.”215  The court also 
determined that the firm did not meet its burden of “proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have placed [the employee’s] candidacy on 
hold even absent this discrimination.”216  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate decision but clarified that “even if a 
plaintiff proves that discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the 
defendant will not be found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.”217  
The Supreme Court adopted the general framework used by the court of appeals; 
however, the Court lowered the burden of proof, stating that the employer need 
only prove it would have reached the same decision by a preponderance of the 
evidence.218 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Id.  
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 235-36. 
215 Id. at 237.  “The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the partners’ remarks about 
[the employee] stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, 
and that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such comments.”  Id. at 236-
37. 
216 Id. at 237. 
217 This approach was slightly different than the trial court’s approach since under the trial court’s 
approach, the defendant remained liable under Title VII even if it had proved that it would have 
reached the same decision. Id. 
218  The Court stated:  
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Accordingly, the mixed motive framework, as established in Price 
Waterhouse, places upon a plaintiff-employee the initial burden of showing that a 
discriminatory reason was a motivating factor in the employment decision.219  
Once the employee meets this burden, the employer must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision 
based on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.220  Thus, in the mixed motive 
context, an employer assumes a much higher burden than the burden it assumes in 
single motive cases.221  Specifically, in mixed motive cases, employers carry the 
burdens of both production and persuasion to establish the same decision 
defense.222  If the employer is able to meet both burdens and establish the same 
decision defense, the employee’s damages are limited to declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and attorney fees.223  If, however, the employer cannot establish 
the same decision defense, the employee is entitled to the full panoply of damages 
under Title VII.224 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in 
an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken 
the plaintiff’s gender into account. Because the courts below erred by deciding that the defendant 
must make this proof by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and remand the case to that court for further 
proceedings.  
Id. at 258.   Moreover, while the Court’s opinion in this case caused some confusion as to whether 
the mixed motive framework applied only where the plaintiff-employee established his or her case 
with direct evidence, the Court later clarified that the mixed motive framework was equally 
applicable in cases where the plaintiff used circumstantial evidence to prove his or her case.  See 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).  As a result, some scholars have opined that 
Costa essentially eliminated the single motive analysis.  See also AVERY supra note 182, at 157-
60, n.6 (7th ed. 2004). 
219  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
220 Id. 
221  See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 94-95. 
224 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2011). 
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Hostile work environment claims involving equal opportunity harassers 
can be bifurcated in a similar way that disparate treatment cases have been 
divided into single motive and mixed motive frameworks.  For example, in hostile 
work environment cases involving single motive sexual harassment, courts can 
continue to apply the traditional “but for” standard for determining causation.  
Under the “but for” framework, the plaintiff carries the burdens of both 
production and persuasion to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment.225  
This requires that a plaintiff-employee establish that:  (1) the conduct was 
unwelcome, (2) the conduct occurred because of the employee’s sex, (3) the 
conduct was sufficiently severe and/or pervasive, and (4) that there is a reason to 
impute liability for such conduct to the employer.226 
In contrast to these heavy burdens placed upon the plaintiff-employee, the 
“but for” test places a very low burden of production on the employer.  
Essentially, all that an employer must do is produce evidence that the harasser is 
an equal opportunist; the employee is then placed in the precarious position of 
establishing that the harassment occurred “but for” the employee’s sex.227  This is 
substantially easier in the equal opportunity harasser context because the nexus 
between the harassing conduct and its motivation is weakened.  In contrast to this 
approach, courts should place a heavier burden of proof on the employer. 
Under my proposed analytical approach, the employee would have to 
introduce facts that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the 
harassment occurred “because of sex.”  This burden would be similar to the “sex 
per se” rule or the individualized analysis approach discussed in Section IV.228  
Once the employee meets this burden, the employer carries the burdens of 
production and persuasion to establish the equal opportunity harasser defense.  To 
meet this burden, the employer has to utilize the “reverse Oncale” approach.229  
For example, in a typical situation involving a female plaintiff and a male 
harasser, this approach would require the employer to produce evidence, as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
226 Id. at 66-67. 
227 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.  
228 See supra Part IV, Section B.	  
229 See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,	  523 U.S. 75. 
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as persuade the trier of fact of one or more of the following: (1) that the harasser 
is homosexual, (2) that the harasser is motivated by a general hostility towards the 
presence of all employees in the workplace, or (3) that the harasser treated men 
and women equally in a mixed-sex workplace.  In essence, the equal opportunity 
harasser defense would be treated as an affirmative defense.  If the employer fails 
to meet its burden, judgment would be for the plaintiff.  If, instead, the employer 
is able to establish its burden, the employer would prevail and summary judgment 
in the employer’s favor would be appropriate. 
Under the first method, proof that a male harasser, who harasses a female 
employee, was homosexual would provide some evidence that the harasser did 
not harass the female “because of sex” since his homosexuality would suggest 
that he was not acting based on any sexual desire for the female employee.230  If 
the employer introduced this type of evidence, it is highly likely that he would 
also be required to establish proof of either the second or third method since it is 
possible that there could be a case where a homosexual male is harassing a female 
for the very fact that he may be envious of her femininity or attempting to exert 
power over her.231  Pursuant to the second method, proof that the harasser is 
motivated by a general hostility towards all employees in the workplace would 
help to reduce the likelihood of “but for” causation since it could be argued that 
the harassment is not occurring “because of sex” but instead because the harasser 
has a distain for all people in the workplace.  Finally, pursuant to the third 
method, much like the second method, evidence that all employees were treated 
the same, regardless of sex, again, establishes that the harassment did not occur 
“because of sex,” but for some other unrelated reason. 
Treating the equal opportunity harasser defense as an affirmative 
defense232 recognizes that an employer may have a legitimate defense to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra note 154-56 and accompanying text; Schwartz, supra note 83 at 1741. 
232 The U.S. Supreme Court stated:  
Moreover, since we hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the 
issue whether gender played a part in the employment decision, the situation 
before us is not the one of “shifting burdens” that we addressed in Burdine.  
Instead, the employer’s burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative 
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employee’s hostile work environment claim. Regardless, the burdens of 
production and persuasion should be allocated to the employer, which essentially 
shifts the unfair requirement from the plaintiff to the employer. 
B. Leveling the Burdens of Proof: Fair Allocations of Production 
and Persuasion 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have generated a 
substantial amount of discussion regarding the necessary pleading requirements 
for plaintiffs in civil rights cases.  More importantly, these cases have reshaped 
plaintiffs’ ability to challenge discrimination that violates Title VII by closing the 
doors of opportunity for plaintiffs in civil rights cases.233 
First, it will be helpful to describe the initial standard for pleading that was 
established in Conley v. Gibson.234 In 1957, during a time period when the 
Supreme Court was changing its attitude about race relations and the use of the 
federal courts to redress racial discrimination, Justice Black drafted the Conley 
decision, which invited plaintiffs to federal court and allowed the use of discovery 
to substantiate their cases.235 After fifty years of a “no set of facts” standard set 
forth in Conley v. Gibson, which opened the door for plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases, the Supreme Court established the heightened standard for 
plaintiffs in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.236 In 2007, the 
Supreme Court began its transformation of the pleading standard when the Court 
“retired” the “no set of facts” standard and established the plausibility standard in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the 
employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another. 
 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246. 
233 See generally David Green, Friend or Foe: The Supreme Court’s “Plausible Claim” Standard 
Provides Another Barrier for Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Cases (forthcoming Spring 
2012).  
234 See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41.  
235 See id. 
236 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,	   556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1961). 
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anti-trust conspiracy claims.237  Although it was initially unclear whether the 
plausibility standard was limited to anti-trust claims, the Supreme Court in Iqbal 
established that the standard would apply in all cases.238 Interestingly, neither 
Twombly nor Iqbal were employment discrimination cases; however, the Supreme 
Court’s new standard clearly raised the bar for plaintiffs in all cases, including 
employment discrimination cases.239 
To adequately explain why my burden-shifting/reverse Oncale approach is 
of critical importance, it is necessary to first provide a brief background of the 
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard.  I will then discuss how this 
standard has set an unreasonably high pleading requirement for plaintiff-
employees, especially in the context of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment cases. 
 
1. The Twombly and Iqbal Plausibility Pleading Standard 
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions of the Supreme Court have commenced 
a revolution in pleading standards.240  These cases stand for the proposition that 
plaintiffs, in order to survive dismissal, must establish a plausible claim of 
discrimination.241  In Twombly, a group of plaintiffs, identified as subscribers of 
telephone and internet services, filed suit alleging that the defendants violated the 
first section of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by inflating charges for local 
telephone and high-speed internet services.242  The plaintiffs made two specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See generally Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
238 See generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,	  556 U.S. 662 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 
Conley, 355 U.S. 41 (1961). 
239 Id. 
240  See generally David Green, supra note 233. 
241  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
242 The plaintiffs were a group of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) and the 
defendants were a group of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers.  ILEC’s were created after 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) divested itself of its local exchange 
carriers as part of its agreement to settle a lawsuit filed by United States Justice Department for 
antitrust violations.  The local exchange carriers (“LECs”) were responsible for providing regional 
telephone service for their respective geographic localities.  After the agreement, there were seven 
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allegations.243  First, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in “parallel 
conduct” in each of their respective geographic regions that was designed to 
thwart the plaintiffs’ efforts to compete with the defendants.244 Second, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants illegally agreed to refrain from competing 
against each other.245  
The district court dismissed the case, holding that mere allegations of 
parallel business conduct, without more, are insufficient to establish a claim under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.246  A plaintiff must adduce facts that “ten[d] to 
exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
LECs including: Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern 
Bell, SBC Communications, and U.S. West.  The LECs that were in existence at the time of the 
divesture are referred to as incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”), whereas any 
subsequently created LEC is referred to as a competitive local exchange carrier (“CLEC”).  
Additionally, as part of the settlement agreement, the ILECs were obligated “to share [their] 
network[s] with [the CLECs].”  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004).   A CLEC could make use of an ILEC’s network in any of three ways: 
by (1) “purchas[ing] local telephone services at wholesale rates for resale to end users,” (2) 
“leas[ing] elements of the [ILEC’s] network ‘on an unbundled basis,’” or (3) “interconnect[ing] its 
own facilities with the [ILEC’s] network.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 
(1999) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)).” 
243 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
244 These actions “included making unfair agreements with the [plaintiffs] for access to [the 
defendants’] networks, providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing 
in ways designed to sabotage the [plaintiffs’] relations with their own customers.” Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 550-51. Because of this conduct, the plaintiffs argued that they were disadvantaged by 
having to pay more for services. See id. 
245 In support of their argument, the plaintiffs alleged that such illegal agreements could be 
“inferred from the [defendants’] common failure ‘meaningfully [to] pursu[e]’ ‘attractive business 
opportunit[ies]’ in contiguous markets where they possessed ‘substantial competitive 
advantages.’” The plaintiffs included a direct quote from a defendant CEO who stated that 
competing in the territory of another defendant “might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but 
that doesn’t make it right.” The plaintiffs’ contention was that this statement provided sufficient 
evidence that the defendants’ decision not to compete against each other was predicated upon an 
illegal agreement. Id. at 551. 
246 Id. at 552. 
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parallel behavior.”247  According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to do this 
because the defendants’ resistance to incursion of the plaintiffs could be fully 
explained by the fact that the defendants were primarily concerned with defending 
their own territories and not because of a mutual conspiracy.248  As to the 
plaintiffs’ second argument, that the defendants refrained from competing with 
each other, the district court found that there was no real evidence to suggest that 
the defendants would have gained a financial benefit from competing with each 
other.249  Thus, their decision not to compete with each other was not suggestive 
of a conspiracy.250  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying upon the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Conley, reversed the district court.251  In Conley, the Supreme 
Court held that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”252  In Twombly, the 
Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had satisfied Conley’s “no set of 
facts” test for pleading requirements.253  The Supreme Court, however, reversed 
the Second Circuit and overruled the “no set of facts” standard of pleading set 
forth in Conley.254  Finding that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to sufficiently 
plead a cause of action for a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Twombly 
Court replaced the old Conley rule with a new “plausibility standard” that 
established the threshold requirements for adequate pleading in a complaint: 
While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a 
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] 
to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Id.  
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. at 553-56. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
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formulaic recitation of a cause of the elements of a cause of action 
will not do.  Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the 
allegations in the complaint are true.255 
The Court emphasized that this new plausibility standard “does not impose 
a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact[s] 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the 
plaintiff’s allegations].” 256 
While the new plausibility standard itself was clear enough, the Court’s 
decision in Twombly caused considerable confusion because it left the legal 
community wondering if the standard would apply only to antitrust matters--as 
was the specific situation in Twombly—or to complex litigation in general, or to 
all cases.257  This question was answered by the Court in its 2009 decision in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.258 
In Iqbal, the plaintiff, who was Muslim, brought a discrimination suit 
against numerous federal officials after he was arrested and detained following 
the events of September 11.259  The plaintiff alleged that these officials “each 
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [the plaintiff] 
to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological 
interest.”260  The federal officials filed a motion to dismiss which the district court 
denied.261  The district court, applying the Conley standard, reasoned that “it 
cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on which [the plaintiff] would be 
entitled to relief as against” the federal officials.262  The court of appeals also held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). 
256 Id. at 556. 
257 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
258 Id.  
259 Id. at 1942. 
260 Id. at 1944 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
261 Id. 
262 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to establish a valid claim of 
discrimination, but for different reasons.263  According to the court of appeals, the 
district court erred in applying Conley’s “no set of facts test,” since the Court 
retired that standard in Twombly.264  Specifically, the court of appeals interpreted 
Twombly to require a “flexible plausibility standard” that compels a pleader to 
amplify his factual allegations only in certain cases.265  Reasoning that the 
plaintiff’s case in Iqbal was not one of the types of cases that Twombly was 
intended to affect, the court of appeals held that amplification was unnecessary 
and that the plaintiff’s claim was sufficient.266 
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court because the plaintiff’s 
claim did not meet the plausibility requirement set forth in Twombly.267  
According to the Court, Twombly was intended to apply to all pleadings.268  
Moreover, it reasoned that its retirement of the “no set of facts” doctrine and 
implementation of the plausibility requirement was premised upon two 
principles.269  First, while a court must accept as true the allegations that a 
plaintiff pleads in his complaint, such deference does not apply when a plaintiff 
pleads legal conclusions.270  As such, mere conclusory statements relating to the 
elements necessary to establish a cause of action are not enough to meet the 
pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.271 The 
second principle necessitates that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 1954. 
268 Id. at 1953. 
269 Id. at 1949. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. (noting that “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era, … it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 
with nothing more than conclusions.”) Id. at 1950. 
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for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”272  Determining whether a complaint sets 
forth a plausible claim is described as: 
[A] context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 
on its judicial experience and common sense.  But where the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not 
“show[n]”--that the pleader is entitled to relief.273 
Applying this standard to the plaintiff’s claim, the Court held that the complaint 
was insufficient.274  The Court first determined that the conclusory statements in 
the plaintiff’s complaint were not entitled to any assumption of truthfulness.275  
As such, the plaintiff’s statements were merely “bare assertions, much like the 
pleading of conspiracy in Twombly amount[ed] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic 
recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that 
[the defendants] adopted a policy “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 276  After dealing with these 
statements, the Court considered the remaining nonconclusory statements in the 
complaint and determined that they alone were insufficient to establish that the 
plaintiff’s claim was plausible.277 278 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Id. 
273 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff asserted that: 
 (1) [That the defendants] knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of 
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest; 
(2) that Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy; [and] 
(3) that Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing it 
Id. at 1951. 
276 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.  
277 Since Arab Muslim hijackers perpetrated the September 11 attacks, the Court reasoned that: 
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Therefore, in considering the plaintiff’s allegation of intentional 
discrimination, the Court ruled that the discrimination complained of by the 
plaintiff was attributable to a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy and thus the 
plaintiff’s averment was not plausible.279  In sum, after  Twombly and Iqbal: 
[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  A claim has facial plausibility when 
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts 
that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 
to relief.’280	  
The main thrust of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions is that legal 
conclusions will not allow a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.281  Instead, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[i]t should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to 
the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even 
though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On 
the facts respondent alleges[,] the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful 
and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally 
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who 
committed terrorist acts.  
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.	  
278 See id. 
279 Id. at 1954.  Even if the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint were sufficient to establish a 
plausible claim of unintentional discrimination, that alone would have been insufficient because 
such an allegation also requires that a plaintiff plead “facts plausibly showing that petitioners 
purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ 
because of their race, religion, or national origin.”  Id. 
280 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations omitted). 
281 Id. 
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the facts must be pled sufficiently so that the reviewing party can determine 
whether the factual allegations present a plausible claim upon which relief can be 
granted.282  Further, this plausibility must appear on the face of the complaint, and 
mere inferences will not be sufficient to escape a motion to dismiss.283   Now, 
judges must “draw on [their] judicial experience and common sense” in deciding 
whether a plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for each element to make the 
plaintiff’s claim plausible.284 Because of this conclusion, some commentators 
have opined that the directed verdict, motion for summary judgment, and motion 
to dismiss have been morphed into one animal.285 As a result, there exists a real 
question as to how the plausibility standard is to be applied and to what extent.286 
Based on the Twombly/Iqbal standard, cases involving state-of-mind, 
intent, and motivation elements are particularly susceptible to dismissal.287  As 
such, this newly created pleading standard “may shut ‘the doors of discovery’ on 
the very litigants who need the procedural resources the Federal Rules previously 
made available.”288 As one critic has opined: 
Perhaps it is appropriate to obligate plaintiffs to plead in greater 
detail about those matters on which they are informed or on which 
they reasonably can inform themselves, even though there may be 
understandable tactical reasons why they might not want to do so.  
The pleading system should not be reduced to a game of hide the 
ball nor should it tolerate laziness or sloth. But to demand fact 
pleading on pain of dismissal when the facts are unknown or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 1950.   
285 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 44 (2010). 
286 The Court’s ruling in Swierkiewicz wherein it refused to establish a heightened pleading 
standard in employment discrimination suits by judicial interpretation further exacerbates this 
confusion.   See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
287 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
288 Miller, supra note 285, at 43. 
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unknowable is a negation of the pleader’s ability to access the civil 
justice system.289 
In light of this new standard, victims of sexual discrimination must now endure 
even more adversity to introduce their claim into a court of law.  
2. Twombly/Iqbal’s Effect on Hostile Work Environment 
Cases 
Hostile work environment cases fit squarely within the confines of the 
very cases that Twombly and Iqbal may eliminate.  Because hostile work 
environment cases require that plaintiffs establish a harasser’s state of mind, such 
information is difficult to ascertain. Thus, many plaintiffs will have to rely heavily 
on discovery to unearth the facts necessary to help them to prove their cases.290 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida’s 
decision in Ansley v. Florida Department of Revenue provides an excellent 
example of how the Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal have lessened 
opportunities to remedy discrimination.291  In Ansley, a plaintiff-employee filed a 
claim pursuant to both Title VII and Florida’s Civil Rights Act for gender and 
disability discrimination, alleging that he was treated badly and terminated based 
on pretext.292  The plaintiff, however, never articulated the employer’s alleged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Id. at 43-44; cf. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 231 n.211, 595 
(2004) (noting that in the German procedural system, which requires the pleadings to contain 
developed factual assertions and identify potential sources of proof for them, less detail is required 
when the necessary information is held by the opposing party or nonparty). 
290 Twombly and Iqbal have also discouraged attorneys from bringing legitimate claims – claims 
that would have been litigated prior to Twombly and Iqbal.  “Plaintiffs’ lawyer Elizabeth Cabraser, 
a partner at San Francisco’s Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, said the plausibility requirement 
has forced her to reject some cases that she might have taken on prior to the two decisions because 
‘often the truth is implausible on its face.’  She said that the cases that are never brought can be the 
cases that would be most important.”  Jeff Jeffrey, Assessing the Changing World of Civil 
Procedure Post-‘Twombly,’ ‘Iqbal’, NAT’L L.J. (2010), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202462842283.  
291 Ansley v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4:09cv161–RH/WCS, 2009 WL 1973548 (N.D. Fla. July 
8, 2009). 
292 Id. at *2. 
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pretextual reason for the decision.293  The plaintiff also failed to provide any 
factual basis for his conclusion that other employees “who were treated better, 
were similarly situated.”294  Additionally, the plaintiff’s discrimination claim, 
which was based on his employer’s alleged violation of Florida’s Civil Rights 
Act, failed to articulate the nature of his medical condition or his employer’s 
perception of his medical condition that resulted in the discrimination.295  For 
these reasons, the court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss.296  However, of 
particular importance, the court noted that the plaintiff’s allegations: 
[M]ight have survived a motion to dismiss prior to Twombly and 
Iqbal.  But now they do not.  The plaintiff in an employment-
discrimination case must allege facts that are either (1) sufficient to 
support a plausible inference of discrimination, or (2) sufficient to 
show, or at least support an inference, that he can make out a prima 
facie case under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas . . . .297 
To ensure that the protections of Title VII are not unreasonably trammeled 
by the Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, it is imperative that the law 
recognizes a complete reallocation of the burdens of proof where harassment is 
perpetrated by an equal opportunity harasser. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
My proposed framework will strike a more fair balance in allocating the 
burdens of proof, as well as the pleading requirements, in hostile work 
environment sex discrimination claims where harassment is perpetrated by an 
equal opportunity harasser.  Additionally, it will significantly enhance the ability 
of female plaintiff-employees to access the protections of Title VII.  At the same 	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time, this model balances the rights of employers to remain free from frivolous 
and unnecessary litigation.	  
In considering the current framework, plaintiffs in these types of cases 
have a difficult, and often times, insurmountable burden of proof, which is wholly 
inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII.  While there has been some progress, 
nearly fifty years after President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Title VII into law, the 
reality of a level playing field continues to remain a dream for many women.  
President Barack Obama captured the essence of this struggle during a speech on 
International Women’s Day when he eloquently stated: 
[A]s we reflect on the hope of our history, we must also face 
squarely the reality of the present -- a reality marked by unfairness, 
marked by hardship for too many women in America. The 
statistics of inequality are all too familiar to us -- how women just 
earn 77 cents for every dollar men make; how one in four women 
is the victim of domestic violence at some point in her life; how 
women are more than half the population, but make up only 17 
percent of the seats in Congress, and less than 3 percent of Fortune 
500 CEOs. 
These, and any number of other facts and figures, reflect the 
fundamental truth that in 2010, full gender equality has not yet 
been achieved; that the task of perfecting America goes on; and 
that all of us, men and women, have a part to play in bending the 
arc in America’s story upward in the 21st century. 
. . . . 
And today, as I see Sasha and Malia getting older, I think about the 
world that they -- and all of America’s daughters -- will inherit. 
And I think about all of the opportunities that are still beyond reach 
for too many young women and too many of our brothers and 
sisters -- too many of our sisters and mothers and aunts -- all of the 
glass ceilings that have yet to be shattered.  We have so much more 
work to do, and that’s why we’re here today. I think about this 
because it reminds me of why I’m here. I didn’t run for President 
so that the dreams of our daughters could be deferred or denied. I 
didn’t run for President to see inequality and injustice persist in our 
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time. I ran for President to put the same rights, the same 
opportunities, the same dreams within the reach for our daughters 
and our sons alike. I ran for President to put the American Dream 
within the reach of all of our people, no matter what their gender, 
or race, or faith, or station.298 
My hope is that my suggested framework can be used as a viable means to 
accomplish the true intent of Title VII—to provide and promote equality. 
Increasing the burden for employers is a small step towards justice for victims of 
sexual discrimination. However, it brings America one step closer to achieving 
the equality the framers of Title VII hoped to achieve so long ago.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Lynn Sweet, Obama, Michelle Mark International Women’s Day, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/03/obama_michelle_mark_internatio.html (Mar. 8, 2010, 
5:14 PM). 
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